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26 AUG 1967

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Assistant to the Deputy to the Director of  
Central Intelligence for NIPE

**SUBJECT** : Annual Report for the President's Foreign  
Intelligence Advisory Board

**REFERENCE** : Memo dtd 26 Jun 67 frm Exec Dir-Compt to  
DD/S, same subj

In response to referent memorandum, I am submitting a draft  
of the Support Directorate contribution to the annual report to the  
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board for the year ending  
30 June 1967. As you suggested to  of my staff, the Office  
of Medical Services' contribution has been condensed and rewritten. 25X1

SIGNED R. L. Bannerman

R. L. Bannerman  
Deputy Director  
for Support


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### C. TRAINING

During the Fiscal Year 1967, we achieved our goal of 275 for recruitment for the Career Training Program and placed 264 Career Trainees as against a goal of 265. A major development in the CT Program was the reduction in scheduled training course time for those Trainees destined for the Clandestine Services. The formal training period was reduced from 64 to 38 weeks because much of the deferred training (particularly language training) can be more relevant if taken later in the officer's career.

The evaluation of the management training program given experimentally to an entire Office was inconclusive. The results, however, were significantly positive to justify consideration of a second trial program for an entire Office. Relative to management training and in keeping with the President's instructions concerning planning, programming and budgeting, fifty-five selected employees attended external training in this field. In addition, the Agency has developed an internal PFB training course which will be run for the first time in September. Another management area of special interest to the USIB has been automatic data

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processing training. In addition to employees taking part-time academic training, 140 employees were sponsored for external ADP training and 277 employees attended our newly designed internal courses.

A significant development in operations training has been a revision of covert action training, as a result of a re-assessment of the Agency covert action mission.

During the year, formal training or briefing in clandestine tradecraft and specialized intelligence subjects was

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given to  foreign nationals

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As a result of last year's implementation of a major Foreign Language Policy, the Agency has engaged in an intensive language proficiency testing drive. We now have a much more accurate picture of our total foreign language capabilities in terms of tested proficiencies. In compliance with the Policy, Agency components also prepared a first set of foreign language competence requirements by position which will be reviewed and up-dated annually. In-house language training activity showed an increase of 76 per cent in total student hours in FY 1967 over the previous fiscal year, an increase which can in large part be attributed to the new policy.

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The final report of the Instructional Systems Study Group which was established last year to conduct a survey of new training systems, particularly Program Assisted Instruction (PAI), finds that PAI can effectively be applied to CIA's training courses on a selective basis and that Computer Assisted Instruction, as a long-term development, can be an effective way of meeting future training requirements. Twelve Agency personnel took an internal course in programmed instruction and developed eight useful programs. During FY 1968 we expect to develop additional programs for courses or parts of courses.

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
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OFFICE OF SECURITY

H. Protection of Sensitive U. S. Intelligence Data, Sources and Methods.


1. Controls and compartmentation of particularly sensitive intelligence data and techniques.



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The CIA has provided security assistance and guidance to those civilian departments and agencies of the government which will be studying under the auspices of *Pres. Scient. Advisory Comm.* PSAC and the DOD, the intelligence collected from certain sensitive sources for possible application to their interests. Further, the CIA has assisted the Department of Interior in the security indoctrinations, location and establishment of a site at which this type intelligence source material may be maintained without reduction of the tight security safeguards employed in the intelligence community.

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The Security Committee of USIB prepared a proposed DCID establishing uniform personnel security criteria for access to compartmented intelligence information. After approval by the Board, the Directive was issued on 23 June 1967 as DCID 1/14. It establishes for the entire intelligence community uniform standards of investigation, appraisal and clearance for all personnel to be given access to any compartmented intelligence system.

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H. Protection of Sensitive U. S. Intelligence Data, Sources and Methods.

2. Controls on release of classified information to foreign governments, officials, and international bodies.

The CIA has conducted security surveys, with favorable findings, of the procedures and controls employed by the

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CIA continues to participate in the activities of the National Military Information Disclosure Policy Committee.

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The release processing of NIE's, SNIE's and NIS's to foreign governments includes a review and recommendation by the Office of Security.

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H. Protection of Sensitive U. S. Intelligence Data, Sources and Methods.

3. Controls on other releases of intelligence-related information, including releases to the press.

The problem of unauthorized disclosure of intelligence in the press has continued to be a major concern of the Security Committee. There are simply no ready solutions to some of these problems and only continual alertness and constant security consciousness can help stop the trickle of leaks which frustrate our security procedure, lessen the effectiveness of our collection effort and strengthen the hands of opposition services.

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K. Counterintelligence Activities Abroad.

2. Personnel security screening and supervision.

The Security Committee completed a study on provocations and harassments directed against U. S. Nationals in Soviet/Satellite areas. USIB has approved the report for distribution throughout the intelligence community as an aid in defensive briefings.

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The current policies and procedures for processing and maintaining current records on all categories of witting non-staff personnel were analyzed and plans made for updating as necessary. This will further enhance the effectiveness of the processing and controls of contractual personnel who travel overseas on CIA business.

All outgoing chiefs of stations and bases are given detailed briefings on overall CIA personnel security policies and personnel security matters within their area of responsibility.

In the interest of tightening personnel security by providing current investigative data on Agency staff employees, approximately ☐ reinvestigation cases were completed.

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K. Counterintelligence Activities Abroad.

3. Physical security.

25X1 The Security Survey Program was expanded by making surveys in depth  stations and bases in South America, Africa, Near East and Far East (Vietnam). All phases of physical security were covered with particular emphasis on safekeeping equipment, alarm systems, secure areas or vaults, destruction capability and all aspects of handling classified material. The



A study revealed that certain types of equipment commonly used in offices are subject to serious security vulnerability. Security representatives of all USIB agencies were briefed and provided literature and advice on countermeasures. Also a world-wide survey was made of Agency facilities to determine the location, number and type of machines involved. CIA is now implementing an appropriate countermeasures program.

An Agency proposal to establish specifications for a security vault has been accepted by the Inter-Agency Advisory

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Committee on Security Equipment. CIA is attempting to get

25X1  included on the Government Schedule so that all participating agencies may have the advantage of direct procurement of this device for their overseas facilities. At present all such purchases by other agencies must come through CIA.

CIA initiated a research and development program to develop or identify new equipment, devices and systems to detect surreptitious entry into areas and security containers.

A joint program was undertaken with other USIB agencies to determine the threat to security containers and locking devices by radiological attack.

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M. DEFICIENCIES

In our efforts toward more effective management we have identified certain deficiencies in procedures and management information. Deficient areas include course objectives, course syllabi, course coordination, the real cost of training; and the lack of an effective data base.

The following actions have been taken to correct these deficiencies. We have established a Training Coordinator for our CT Program which represents almost half of our training effort. Concurrently, a major coordination effort has been launched with appropriate Directorate officials to ensure that the training objectives meet the customer requirements. We have completed syllabi for all courses. In addition, three internal OTR studies are under way to accurately evaluate all training from the standpoint of course content, course patronage, and course cost.

In recent years the Training Office has been required to produce an increasing multitude of training statistics and other detailed training information. This has brought into focus a need for a training data base which will provide the major portion of the response to these many and complex inquiries. Preliminary research has begun toward establishing

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such a base and it is expected that a working program will be  
in effect by the end of this fiscal year.

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